Due Process Requirements for Use of Non-Statutory Inferences in Criminal Cases, Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1973 Issue 4 
January 1973 
Due Process Requirements for Use of Non-Statutory Inferences in 
Criminal Cases, Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Due Process Requirements for Use of Non-Statutory Inferences in Criminal Cases, Barnes v. United 
States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973), 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 897 (1973). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/7 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR USE OF NON-STATUTORY
INFERENCES IN CRIMINAL CASES
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973)
Defendant was convicted on two counts each of knowingly possessing
United States Treasury checks stolen from the mail,1 forging, and ut-
tering the checks knowing them to be forged. 2  The federal district
court judge instructed the jury, inter alia, that unexplained possession
of recently stolen mail justifies an inference that the defendant possessed
the mail knowing it to be stolen.3  The court of appeals affirmed.-
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed and held: The
instruction comported with due process.5
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1970) provides:
Whoever ... unlawfully has in his possession any... mail... which has
been so stolen . . . knowing the same to have been stolen [shall be fined
or imprisoned or both].
2. 18 U.S.C. § 495 (1970) provides:
Whoever . . . forges . . . writing, for the purpose of obtaining or receiving
... from the United States ... any sum of money; or
Whoever utters . . . any . . . forged . . . writing, with the intent to defraud
the United States, knowing the same to be . . . forged [shall be fined
or imprisoned or both].
3. The judge instructed the jury as follows:
Possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordi-
narily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the inference and
find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the
case, that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen ....
If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case
that the mail described in the indictment was stolen, and that while recently
stolen the contents of said mail here, the four United States Treasury checks,
were in the possession of the defendant you would ordinarily be justified in
drawing from those facts the inference that the contents were possessed by the
accused with knowledge that it was stolen property, unless such possession is
explained by facts and circumstances in this case which are some way consistent
with the defendant's innocence.
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 840 n.3 (1973).
4. Barnes v. United States, 466 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1972).
5. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
Defendant also contended that the instruction violated his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The district court judge properly instructed the jury that
no inferences could be drawn from defendant's failure to testify. The Court noted that
although there may have been pressure upon defendant to testify, the mere massing
of evidence against him did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at
847. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1970); Yee Hem v. United
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For a criminal conviction due process requires that every element
of the crime charged be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.0  The rea-
sonable doubt standard, however, is subject to rules allocating the bur-
den of going forward with the evidence.7 One allocation rule involves
States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925). Nor could the instruction be construed as a com-
ment upon defendant's failure to testify. 412 U.S. at 846 n.12. See United States
v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70-71 (1965).
The Court also rejected defendant's challenge that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that the checks were stolen from the mail. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1970) does not
require that the accused know that the checks were stolen from the mail. The statute
was amended in 1939 to delete this element from the Government's burden of proof.
Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 557, 53 Stat. 1256; H.R. REP. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1939); see United States v. Gardner, 454 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 867 (1972); Smith v. United States, 343 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1958).
6. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), the Court stated:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reason-
able-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
See also Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949).
Although the reasonable doubt standard was first articulated in 1789, the spirit of
the rule can be traced as far back as the fourth century. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 341, at 799 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited
as McCoRMIcK]; J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 558, 559 (1898) [hereinafter cited as THAYER]. The purpose of the rule is to
prevent the conviction of innocent defendants. McCoRMIcK § 341, at 798. See also
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1957). But see Christie & Pye, Presump-
tions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DuKE L.J 919, 929.
Due process also requires that the prosecution's case reach the jury only on the basis
of sufficient evidence. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204, 206 (1960)(conviction for misdemeanor based on no evidence of guilt); cf. United States v. Vuitch,
402 U.S. 62, 72 n.7 (1971) (jury verdict of guilty should be set aside when there is
no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt). It is clear that the prosecution must at a minimum produce sufficient evi-
dence of guilt in order to withstand a directed verdict of acquittal. W. LAFAvE & A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRiMINAL LAW § 8, at 45 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE
& SCOTT]. The proper measure of sufficient evidence varies with jurisdictions. Two
of the United States Courts of Appeals have held that this evidence must match the
ultimate burden of persuasion. Riggs v. United States, 280 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1960);
Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947).
See generally MCCORMICK § 338, at 790, for a discussion of the various standards used.
7. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
One such allocation rule is to place on a defendant the burden of proving the insan-
ity defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). Af-
firmative defenses generally are qualifications of the reasonable doubt standard. When
offering an affirmative defense, the defendant is expected to put forward evidence of
that defense. See, e.g., United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 360-63 (1950);
Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89 (1933). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12,
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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the prosecutor's freedom to use inferences8 to establish elements of the
crime. The extent to which this freedom can be exercised is limited
by the procedural protections of due process.,
An inference allows the jury to infer the existence of a fact based
on other facts that have been proven.10 In a criminal prosecution this
finding is a permissible inference," that is, if a crime is composed of
8. When used in this Comment, "inference" can be equated with what McCormick
terms a "presumption," that is, "a standardized practice, under which certain facts are
held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts."
MCCORMICK § 342, at 803. The term "inference" is used to distinguish the situation
in which the jury will be required to find a certain fact as can be the case in a civil
trial when a presumption is operative. See note 11 infra and accompanying text. With
an inference, the jury will be allowed to infer the existence of a fact in the absence
of countervailing evidence.
The distinction between "presumption" and "inference" is difficult to make given the
Supreme Court's inconsistent use of the two terms. In earlier cases, the phrase "statu-
tory presumption" was used. See, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
The Court now uses the phrase "statutory inference" to describe the same concept.
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). This confusion is virtually un-
avoidable. "One ventures the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest [sic] mem-
ber of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof."' McCoR-
mICK § 342, at 802-03. The classic works on the subject are THAYER 313-52; 9
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2483-98 (3d ed. 1940);'Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer
Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195 (1953); Morgan, Some Observations
Concerning Presumptions, 44 Hv. L. REV. 906 (1931); Orfield, Burden of Proof and
Presumptions in Federal Criminal Cases, 31 U.K.C.L. REv. 30 (1963).
9. See notes 21-45 infra and accompanying text.
10. MCCORMICK § 342, at 803.
Courts and commentators have argued for the practical necessity of using inferences.
First, an inference aids the prosecutor in proving elements that are not susceptible of
direct proof, such as knowledge and intent. United States v. Mooney, 417 F.2d 936,
938 (8th Cir. 1969); Aron v. United States, 382 F.2d 965, 970 (8th Cir. 1967); Bros-
man, The Statutory Presumption (pts. 1 & 2), 5 TuL. L. REv. 17, 178, 204 (1930);
Chamberlin, Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287
(1928). Since the defendant's testimony, which would provide the only direct proof
of these elements, is not likely to be forthcoming, the inference is invaluable. Sec-
ondly, certain crimes are apt to be committed out of the public eye. Again, direct
proof may lie only with the defendant. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67-
68 (1965) (operation of illegal still); United States v. Mooney, 417 F.2d 936, 938
(8th Cir. 1969) (mail theft); United States v. Britton, 24 F. Cas. 1239, 1241 (No.
14,650) (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (forgery). Thirdly, the use of inferences expedites trials
in that the prosecutor will not have to labor over what he cannot establish by direct
proof.
1I. A conclusive or mandatory presumption would violate due process. Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). In a civil case the standard is different;
a presumption may force a party to take on the burdens of production and persuasion.
An "irrebuttable presumption" forecloses a factual issue in favor of the party for whom
the presumption operates. MCCoRMIcK § 345.
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three elements and two have been established, the jury may be allowed,
but not required, to infer the third.'" The practical effect of the infer-
ence is to pressure the defendant into going forward with the evi-
dence.' 3 A defendant who chooses to go forward need only present
enough evidence to raise a doubt in the jury's mind as to the existence
of the fact or element to be inferred. 14  A silent defendant assumes
the risk that the jury will follow the natural probative force of the
proven facts.' 5
12. In Barnes, for example, the Government had to show (1) that the defendant
was in possession of the checks, and (2) that the checks were stolen from the mail.
The inference allowed the jury to find (3) that the defendant knew the checks were
stolen.
In Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), defendant was convicted of know-
ing concealment of illegally imported heroin and cocaine. With respect to the heroin,
the Government had to show (1) that the defendant possessed heroin, and (2) that
the heroin was illegally imported. Proof of these facts allowed the jury to find (3)
that the defendant knew the heroin was illegally imported.
13. The government has a heavy burden of proof in a criminal case; the de-
fendant has none. The inferences (they are sometimes called presumptions)
arising from the possession relieve the government of much of that burden. As
a practical matter, they tend to shift the burden to the defendant, however pi-
ously we may say and tell juries that they do not.
Rogers v. United States, 402 F.2d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added). An
inference can never shift the burden of proof in a criminal case. Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943). The prosecution has the burden of proof throughout the
trial. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795 (1952) (dictum); Lilienthal's Tobacco v.
United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1877) (dictum); United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d
602, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 993 (1971); Virgin Islands v. Torres,
161 F. Supp. 699 (D.V.I. 1958); LAFAVE & ScoTr § 8, at 44.
14. Since the prosecution has to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the
defendant need only present evidence that will raise a reasonable doubt. United States
v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1960); Regina v. Hepworth, [1955] 2 Q.B.
600, 602; Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN.
L. REv. 341, 344 (1970). See generally Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assump-
tions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALB L.J. 165,
174-86 (1969).
15. Defendant's contention that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated
was rejected by the Court in Barnes. See note 5 supra. A related problem, the "pre-
sumption of innocence," was not touched upon. This problem was raised by Justice
Black in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432 (1970) (dissenting opinion):
Mhe Constitution requires that the defendant in a criminal case be presumed
innocent and it places the burden of proving guilt squarely on the Govern-
ment. Statutory presumptions such as those involved in this case rob the de-
fendant of at least part of his presumed innocence and cast upon him the bur-
den of proving he is not guilty.
The "presumption of innocence" is not a presumption in the legal sense since it is not
an inference deduced from a given premise. It is more properly an assumption. See
generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); LA-
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The Supreme Court's development of the due process limitations on
the use of inferences prior to Barnes was limited to "statutory infer-
ences." 6  The reasoning of the cases, therefore, was in terms of the
restrictions upon the legislature in prescribing the rules of evidence.17
Although Barnes concerns a common law inference,'8 it is agreed that
the use of the inference is to be scrutinized in the same manner as
a statutory inference. 19 Regardless of the source of the inference, the
FAVE & ScoIT § 8, at 52-53.
The assumption of innocence has long been accorded constitutional stature. See,
e.g., Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); United States v. Fleischman,
339 U.S. 349 (1950); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1894); Lilienthal's
Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1877) (dictum). Arguably, the assump-
tion of innocence is undercut by the jury instruction in Barnes. If the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt applies to each element of the crime, the submission of an in-
ferred element-not proven beyond a reasonable doubt-becomes logically inconsistent
with assumed innocence. Justice Black summarized this contradiction:
It would be a senseless and stupid thing for the Constitution to take all these
precautions to protect the accused from governmental abuses if the Govern-
ment could by some sleight-of-hand trick with presumptions make nullities of
those precautions.
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 430 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
16. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey,
380 U.S. 63 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
17. The legislature has the power to prescribe the evidence which shall be received
in the courts. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943); Yee Hem v. United
States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 349
(1827). However, it is within the province of the courts to pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence to convict. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 86 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 135 (1959).
18. The inference used in Barnes was first stated by the Supreme Court in Wilson
v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 619 (1896):
Possession of the fruits of crime, recently after its commission, justifies the in-
ference that the possession is guilty possession, and, though only prima facie
evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight unless explained by the circum-
stances or accounted for in some way consistent with innocence.
The inference of knowing possession evolved from the conclusive presumption that the
possessor of stolen goods was the thief. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, at 598; see 2
E. EksT, PLEAS OF THE CRowN 656 (1803); THAYER 328. See generally United States
v. Jones, 418 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Millard, 1 Mass. 6 (1804);
Regina v. Exall, 176 Eng. Rep. 850, 852 (N.P. 1866); Regina v. Cockin, 168 Eng. Rep.
1139 (C.C. 1836). The inference is one "running through a dozen centuries." TiHYER
327.
19. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70 (1965); United States v. Johnson,
433 F.2d 1160, 1168 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that statutory and common law infer-
ences are to be treated similarly; this has simply been assumed. In the principal case,
the Court did not discuss this issue at length. 412 U.S. at 845 n.8.
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question presented concerns the sufficiency of the evidence for convic-
tion.20
The Court's initial standard for examining inferences was developed
in a civil case.21  The Court stated that an inference satisfies due proc-
ess if there is a "rational connection" between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact inferred. Stated negatively, the connection can be neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. 22  In the first instance, determining ration-
ality is a legislative function since this determination may concern mat-
ters not within judicial competence.23  A judge is to review the deter-
ruination in the light of "common sense and human experience." 24 If
20. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 407 (1970) ("the question on re-
view is the sufficiency of the evidence"); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 37 (1969)
(issue is whether the statute "permits conviction upon insufficient proof"); Dunlop
v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 502 (1897) (non-statutory inference from unexplained
possession of recently stolen property "is sufficient to authorize the jury to convict").
21. Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910). Mississippi statutes
abolished the fellow-servant rule and made injury to railroad employees on the job
prima facie evidence of the railroad's negligence. The railroad challenged the statutes
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, but
the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment against the railroad for wrongful death of an
employee. Id.
22. Id. at 43:
That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not
constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of equal protection of
the law, it is only essential that there be some rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one
fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely ar-
bitrary mandate.
The first criminal case to use the rational connection standard was Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Petitioner, a felon, was convicted under the Federal Fire-
arms Act, ch. 850, § 2, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938), which prohibited the receipt by a felon
of a firearm in interstate commerce. Possession of a firearm by a felon raised the
inference that it had been shipped in interstate commerce and received after June 30,
1938. The Court, using the standard developed in Mobile, I. & K.C.R.R. v. Tumipseed,
219 U.S. 35 (1910), held that the inference violated due process:
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be
no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed ....
319 U.S. at 467.
23. In using the rational connection standard, the Supreme Court deferred to legis-
lative judgment with regard to the facts underlying inferences. United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965):
The process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature,
highly empirical, and in matters not within specialized judicial competence or
completely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the capacity
of Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from
it.
24. See Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918); United States v. Gard-
ner, 454 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 867 (1972); McAbee v.
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the connection between facts is "strained" beyond common sense it is
rejected. 25  The rational connection standard was superseded in later
cases.26
Two variations of the rational connection standard have been used.
The first, "greater includes lesser," recognizes that the greater power
of the legislature to prohibit certain conduct includes the lesser power
to create inferences as the means of proof.2 7  This standard was re-
jected soon after its conception on the ground that the Court's role is
to view all the elements of the crime as defined by Congress. 28 The
second variation, "comparative convenience," allows the legislature to
create inferences that will elicit evidence more convenient for the de-
fendant to produce than for the prosecution to discover.2 9 This stand-
ard was rejected because it would allow the legislature to define a crime
in a way that would shift the burden of persuasion, which would be
impermissible in a criminal trial.30
United States, 434 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d
561 (2d Cir. 1958).
25. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 139 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463. 467-68 (1943).
26. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
27. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928). A Kansas statute made bank directors
personally liable for accepting deposits with knowledge of the bank's insolvency. Proof
of the bank's insolvency was considered prima facie evidence of a director's knowledge.
The Court, per Justice Holmes, upheld the presumption, noting that the liability was
less than what might have been imposed. He concluded, "Mhe thing to be considered
is the result reached, not the possibly inartificial or clumsy way of reaching it." Id.
at 94.
28. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943). In United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136 (1965), petitioner was convicted of possessing an illegal still. The infer-
ence involved allowed the jury to infer possession from presence at the still. The infer-
ence was struck down using the rational connection standard. In reference to the
"greater includes lesser" standard, the Court stated:
It may be, of course, that Congress has the power to make presence at an ille-
gal still a punishable crime, but we find no clear indication that it intended to
exercise this power. The crime remains possession, not presence ....
Id. at 144. See generally MCCORMICK § 344, at 812-13; Ashford & Risinger, supra note
14, at 177-79.
29. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934) (dictum):
[W]ithin limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from
the state . . . and cast on a defendant. The limits are in substance these, that
the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be re-
quired to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least
upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the
shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without sub-
jecting the accused to hardship or oppression ....
30. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943). Although the Court rejected
the comparative convenience standard as controlling, the standard was recognized as
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The Court articulated a new standard in Leary v. United States. 1
Defendant was convicted of possessing marijuana with the knowledge
that the marijuana was illegally imported. The Court maintained
that in order to comport with due process, there must be "substantial
assurance" that the inferred fact "more likely than not" flows from the
proven fact.3 3  Moreover, the Court examined at length the legislative
facts that led Congress to conclude that the inference was rational.34
The Court held that the link between possession of marijuana and
knowledge that the marijuana was illegally imported was irrational and
constitutionally untenable.35 Having disposed of the inference on the
more-likely-than-not standard, the Court declined to consider whether
the reasonable doubt standard should also regulate inferences.30
In Turner v. United States37 the Court was confronted with an infer-
ence, similar to that in Leary, dealing with possession of heroin and
a corollary to the rational connection standard. Id. at 467. The rationale behind
the comparative convenience standard represents an argument for using inferences in
proving facts on which defendant's testimony will not be forthcoming. See note 10
supra and accompanying text.
31. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
32. Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, § 106, 70 Stat. 570, provided:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defendant is shown
to have or to have had the marihuana in his possession, such possession shall
be deemed sufficient to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains his
possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
33. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969):
The upshot of Tot, Gainey, and Romano is, we think, that a criminal statu-
tory presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or "arbitrary," and hence
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that
the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend.
The use of the word "upshot" is unclear. The Court seems to be saying that the more-
likely-than-not standard is the conclusion of Tot, Gainey, and Romano taken as a
developing whole. The Leary standard, at root, is a standard of rationality, but the
qualification, "substantial assurance," appears to add an element of scrutiny that "ra-
tional connection" lacks. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. This scrutiny
is reflected in the Court's consideration of the legislative record in Leary. See text
accompanying note 34 infra.
34. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 39-52 (1969).
35. Id. at 52-53.
36. Id. at 36 n.64.
The reasonable doubt standard means that the evidence is sufficient for the rational
juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Barnes v. United States,
412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). This standard would compel the jury to treat the inferred
fact or element in the same manner as it is to treat all other facts or elements to
be proved.
37. 396 U.$. 398 (1970),
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cocaine."' Once again the legislative record was closely scrutinized.
Applying the more-likely-than-not standard to possession of cocaine,
the Court concluded that it could not be "sufficiently sure" the cocaine
was illegally imported.39 However, because domestic heroin is virtually
nonexistent, the Court concluded that it is "common sense" to know
that heroin is illegally imported.40  The due process standard for heroin
was stated in the conjunctive: The inference satisfied both the more-
likely-than-not and the reasonable doubt standards.41
The Court in Barnes followed the conjunctive standards approach
of Turner without specifying whether the more-likely-than-not or the
reasonable doubt standard was controlling. The Court's reasoning,
however, diverged from prior cases. The Court failed to examine the
possible reasons for using the inference and relied primarily on the cri-
terion of common sense.42  The statute in Barnes does not mention
38. Act of Nov. 2, 1951, ch. 666, § 1, 65 Stat. 768:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this subdivision the defendant is shown to
have or have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant ex-
plains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
39. 396 U.S. at 419.
The use of "sufficiently sure" echoes the "substantial assurance" that the Leary Court
felt was necessary with the more-likely-than-not standard. See note 33 supra.
40. 396 U.S. at 417.
41. ld. at 416:
Whether judged by the more-likely-than-not standard applied in Leary v. U.S.,
supra, or by the more exacting reasonable-doubt standard normally applicable
in criminal cases, § 174 is valid insofar as it permits the jury to infer that
heroin possessed in this country is a smuggled drug.
The majority of commentators feel that this statement of alternatives does not explicit-
/v establish the reasonable doubt standard for purposes of evaluating inferences. See, e.g.,
MCCORMICK § 344, at 816; Fuller & Ulrich, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of
Statutory Presumptions That Lessen the Burden of the Prosecution, 25 U. MiAMI L.
REV. 420 (1971); 4 SUFFOLK L. REV. 929 (1970). But see Christie & Pye, supra note
6, at 923 n.24, in which the authors note that Justice White's opinion is unclear, but
conclude that the reasonable doubt standard was established. It is difficult to recon-
cile this conclusion with Justice White's statement.
42. 412 U.S. at 845:
On the basis of the evidence alone, common sense and experience tell us that
petitioner must have known or been aware of the high probability that the
checks were stolen.
Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissenting, did not agree with the majority's "com-
mon sense and experience" standard. Both dissenters felt there were equally plausible
reasons to believe that petitioner did not know that the checks were stolen. Id. at
851, 854. This method of inquiry seems to be more consistent with the approach taken
in Turner and Leary. The majority's position is a return to the approach taken in
the "rational connection" cases of deferring to the legislature. See note 23 supra and
accompanying text.
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any inferences, 43 but the case law interpreting the statute has uniformly
implemented the common law inference as the means of proof for the
element of knowledge.44 Noting the long judicial acceptance of the
inference and its common sense quality, the Court held that both the
more-likely-than-not and the reasonable doubt standards were met.4"
Barnes, more so than Turner, fails to articulate a due process stand-
ard beyond the particular facts of the case. The development of the
Court's treatment of inferences prior to Turner indicated a rising thresh-
old which inferences had to meet. The cases through Turner demon-
strated a searching for facts that would sustain or defeat inferences.
Barnes yields no new standards and pays little attention to the facts
underlying the inference. It is now difficult to determine the exact
relationship between inferences and due process. Despite vigorous dis-
sents4 6 and legislative activity,4 7 the Court has declined to extend the
Given the Court's treatment of the distinction between statutory and common law
inferences, see note 19 supra, the majority's reasoning cannot be explained on the
basis of the type of inferences involved.
43. See note 1 supra.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 454 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 867 (1972); United States v. Halprin, 450 F.2d 322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 994 (1971); United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1958); Brandenburg v. United States, 78 F.2d
811 (3d Cir. 1935).
45. The Court's holding is extremely narrow: "We do not decide today whether
a judge-formulated inference of lesser age or less widely accepted may properly be em-
phasized by means of a jury instruction." 412 U.S. at 846 n.11.
46. Id. at 848 (Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting); Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398, 425 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 84-
85 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
47. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE REFORM OF FEDERAL,
CRIMINAL LAws (1971); S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972); Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence, 56 FRD). 183 (1973). Both the FINAL REPORT, supra at § 103(4)(b),
and S. 1 supra at 244, contain the following statutory language (emphasis added):
[Un submitting the issue of the existence of the presumed fact to a jury, the
court shall charge that, although the evidence must establish the presumed
fact beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may arrive at that judgment on the
basis of the presumption alone, since the law regards the facts giving rise to
the presumption as strong evidence of the fact presumed.
It would seem that the revisers of the Criminal Code have gone further than the Court.
It is arguable that Turner has been the impetus here. See note 41 supra and accom-
panying text. The narrow holding in Barnes, therefore, seems to be anachronistic.
The Proposed Rules adopt a similar standard:
When the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or
negatives a defense, the judge may submit the question of guilt or of the exis-
tence of the presumed fact to the jury, if, but only if, a reasonable juror on
the evidence as a whole, including the evidence of the basic facts, could find
guilt or the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
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protection that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would guaran-
tee.
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, supra at § 303(b) (emphasis added). It
should be noted, however, that § 303 has been deleted from the rules because the
matter was dealt with in the proposals of the FINAL REPORT and S. 1., HOUSE SUB-
COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 931 CONG., 1ST
SEss., REPORT ON H.R. 5436, at 8-9 (Comm. Print 1973). The hearings on the
Proposed Rules reveal that the witnesses were dissatisfied with the
Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 212-14 (1973). Witnesses pointed out that
the narcotics statutes cited in the Note had been repealed. Hearings on the Proposed
Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 221-23, 236 (1973). The Advisory Committee's Note
relies on Gainey as its sole Supreme Court authority. This is anomalous since both
Lear,' and Turner advanced beyond the "rational connection" standard used in Gainey.
See note 33 supra. The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence has since aban-
doned its controversial § 303 in deference to the House Subcommittee's determination.
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